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ABSTRACT—Fundamental to all evidence rules is the division of
responsibility between the judge, who determines the admissibility of
evidence, and the jury, which gauges its weight. In most evidentiary
contexts, such as those involving hearsay and character, threshold
admissibility obligations are clear and relatively uncontroversial. The same
is not true for scientific evidence. The complex nature of scientific
inference, and in particular the challenges of reasoning from group data to
individual cases, has bedeviled courts. As a result, courts vary considerably
on how they define the judge’s gatekeeping task under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 and its state equivalents.
This Article seeks to reconceptualize gatekeeping analysis in scientific
evidence cases based on the nature of science itself, specifically, the
division between general and case-specific scientific findings. Because
expert testimony describing basic science, “framework” science, and the
scientific methods an expert uses to reach conclusions transcend the case at
hand, the validity of these facts ought to be determined by the judge. In
contrast, when an expert claims to have used a methodology approved by
the judge, but a dispute arises as to whether the expert in fact did so, the
question becomes one of credibility specific to the case, and is for the jury.
This division between general and case-specific preliminary facts is
simpler to administer than other admissibility–weight frameworks, which
have relied primarily on problematic attempts to distinguish scientific
methods from scientific conclusions. It is also fully consistent with, and
helps implement, basic principles of both constitutional and evidentiary
jurisprudence by ensuring that the trial judge—presumptively better
attuned to matters of general import—decides reliability issues, while the
jury—historically viewed as trier of the facts—is the ultimate arbiter of
those case-specific matters requiring a credibility assessment. Because the
general–specific divide likewise argues for a stiff standard of appellate
review on scientific reliability issues, our alignment of evidence law with
the nature of scientific research also provides the best court-monitored
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mechanism for ensuring that courtroom use of science is both sophisticated
and consistent across cases.
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INTRODUCTION
A mainstay of the law of evidence is the distinction between
admissibility and weight. Judges are tasked with the responsibility of
determining whether proffered evidence is admissible and, if it is, jurors
must decide what weight to give it.1 This division of responsibility holds
across all evidence rules, from basic relevance to hearsay. Hence, a “dying
declaration” that is hearsay is only admissible if the judge determines,
among other things, that the statement was made by a declarant “while
believing that the declarant’s death was imminent.”2 If admitted, the
weight, if any, that should be accorded the particular dying declaration is
up to the jury to decide. The predicate issue of whether the defendant
believed death was imminent is called a “preliminary fact,”3 one that the
judge must determine by a preponderance of the evidence.4 This
1 Throughout this Article, we refer to jurors and juries as the factfinder at trial, since the
admissibility–weight issue is virtually never litigated unless that is the case. However, the analysis
offered here is meant to apply whether the trier of fact is a judge or jury. Even though the judicial and
verdict roles merge in a bench trial, judges should not consider inadmissible scientific evidence any
more than juries should. Furthermore, under our analysis in Part IV, the deference the rulings of a judge
at a bench trial would receive at the appellate level would vary depending on whether the ruling deals
with admissibility or weight.
2 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
3 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a preliminary or predicate fact is “[a] fact necessary to the
operation of an evidentiary rule.” Predicate Fact, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2015).
4 This is the standard in federal court at least. It should also be noted that the preliminary fact
standard is applied differently in different contexts. When the evidence rule deals with expert testimony
or hearsay, the judge must find the preliminary fact by a preponderance of the evidence. See Bourjaily
v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175–76 (1987) (holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard
should govern hearsay admissibility questions under Rule 104). However, when the rule deals with
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prerogative belongs to the judge on the assumption that juries are likely to
attribute significance to an out-of-court statement even if they were to find
that death was not imminent.5
This division of responsibilities between judge and jury also applies to
scientific evidence presented by experts.6 Indeed, because the distinction
between admissibility and weight is endemic to the law of evidence, in
theory the issue has existed for scientific evidence since experts were first
introduced at trial in the nineteenth century.7 Yet the distinction received
little attention until the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.8 The Daubert Court,
interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 702, held that judges are
“gatekeepers” and obligated to determine whether the methods and
principles underlying proffered expert testimony are—more likely than
not—reliable and valid.9 In other words, the Court treated the “evidentiary
reliability” of the scientific evidence proffered in the case as a preliminary
fact and thus within the judge’s purview to determine. Consistent with the
preliminary fact rule in other types of cases, the rationale for this
requirement is that requiring juries to parse unvetted scientific information
and disregard those aspects of it they consider suspect is likely to lead to
ill-considered verdicts.10
In contrast to the usual preliminary fact determination, however, the
complex nature of scientific evidence has created substantial confusion
among courts about just where the judge’s authority to decide admissibility
ends and the jury’s responsibility to assess weight begins. The key variable
in the latter setting, according to Daubert’s original formulation, is whether
the fact is a “conclusion” or something else. Under Daubert, in assessing
admissibility, the judge’s “focus . . . must be solely on principles and
character evidence and related matters, the judge need merely find that “the jury could reasonably find
the conditional fact . . . by a preponderance of the evidence.” Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S.
681, 690 (1988).
5 See infra text accompanying notes 122–23.
6
In this Article, we restrict our analysis to scientific evidence. Although we think the points made
here are applicable to all expert evidence, we limit the discussion to “scientific” expert testimony
because we rely on the structure of scientific inference to set the boundary between admissibility and
weight.
7 As Jennifer Mnookin has pointed out, however, we do not know much about expert admissibility
decisions before the twentieth century. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of
Handwriting Identification Evidence and the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723,
1827 n.264 (2001) (“[T]here has been little effort to grapple directly with how judges made
admissibility determinations about experts in the nineteenth century.”).
8 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
9 Id. at 589 (“[U]nder the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”).
10 See infra text accompanying notes 122–26.
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methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”11 This distinction
between methodology and principles on the one hand and case-specific
conclusions on the other (which we will refer to as the methodology–
conclusions distinction for ease of reference)12 has assumed major
significance. While the Court abandoned the distinction just four years later
in General Electric Co. v. Joiner,13 and while the amendments to Rule 702
three years after Joiner made no mention of it,14 many courts continue to
put considerable emphasis on whether the preliminary fact is about
“methodology” or instead describes “conclusions.”15 Only a minority of
courts have required that the judge preliminarily determine that the expert’s
conclusion was reliably reached using a reliable methodology.16 Most
courts hold that the judge’s sole concern is whether the expert followed an
acceptable methodology, and other decisions have even punted some types
of methodological issues to the jury.17
In this Article, we argue that the methodology–conclusions distinction
has no principled basis in science and thus should have none in law. Since
the distinction does not align with the nature of the evidence that scientists
proffer in court, it is destined to fail and should be explicitly jettisoned. In
its place, courts should adopt a framework that is consonant with the
structure of science itself.
That structure has one central characteristic: science is general in
nature, because it involves study of categories of individuals or cases,
rather than study of a single individual or case.18 Generalization permeates
the scientific enterprise, cutting across methodology, principles, and
conclusions. To take just one example, every aspect of the science on the
11

509 U.S. at 595.
We also use this shorthand because it is the distinction most often stressed by the courts, see
infra text accompanying notes 64–66, and because it is the clearest. Whereas the difference between a
method and a principle or a method and a conclusion is fairly intuitive, the difference between a
principle and a conclusion is not. A principle that is applicable to a particular case can also easily be
viewed as a conclusion about a particular case (e.g., the principle that eyewitnesses tend to be poor at
cross-racial identifications can also serve as a conclusion for an expert on eyewitness testimony). In any
event, as will become clear in this Article, we think that the distinction between principles and
conclusions is irrelevant in terms of defining the judge’s role in determining admissibility.
13 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
14 See FED. R. EVID. 702(c) (stating that “testimony,” which presumably includes conclusions, must
be based on “reliable principles and methods”).
15 See infra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
16 Infra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
17 See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
18 We describe this aspect of science in David L. Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher Slobogin,
Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 419 (2014)
(“Scientists, in their professional lives, almost invariably measure phenomena at the group level and
describe their results statistically.”).
12
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accuracy of eyewitnesses is group-driven: its methodology (for example,
comparing experimental and control groups of eyewitnesses exposed to
different stimuli), the results derived from the methodology (for example,
the finding that people have more difficulty identifying members of another
race than members of their own race) and its legally relevant conclusions
(for example, an opinion that cross-racial identifications are more suspect
than other identifications, all else being equal).19
As we explained in a previous article, the generality of scientific
evidence means that methods and findings that have relevance to one legal
case will be relevant in other cases as well.20 Just as legal procedures and
principles apply across numerous cases, the methodology and conclusions
associated with the research on which experts rely can help resolve
numerous disputes. The studies on cross-racial identification that an
eyewitness expert describes in a case that takes place in 2015 will have
implications for cases decided in 2016 and beyond.
That insight has an important consequence for the distinction between
admissibility and weight: scientific procedures and principles, as well as
any conclusions of general application that are derived from them, ought to
be evaluated by judges, not by juries that sit on a single case. It is a wellestablished aspect of our modern jury system that, while laypeople are in
charge of finding facts specific to the case at hand, courts are the
appropriate entity for ascertaining legal rules that will have application to
other cases,21 a practice that is based in part on an assessment of the relative
capacities of judges and juries and in part on a desire for uniformity across
cases.22 For reasons we develop in this Article,23 the same rule should apply
for facts that will have application to other cases, for the same reasons. A
determination of whether scientific testimony is reliable should be the
province of a legally trained individual cognizant of the difficulties of
determining scientific validity and required to make a public ruling subject

19 For a description of research on eyewitness accuracy, see 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW & SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, §§ 15:11–43, Westlaw (database
updated Dec. 2015).
20 Faigman, Monahan & Slobogin, supra note 18, at 424 (“[S]cience is a product of research that
applies generally to all similarly situated cases.”).
21 Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999 WIS. L. REV.
377, 377 (explaining that, under our current system, judges determine the law and juries apply it,
although also noting that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries many jurists believed that the jury
was to find both fact and law).
22 See Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law–Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REV.
1867, 1875, 1924–25 (1966) (arguing that, unlike jury verdicts, judicial conclusions create “a precedent
influencing the determination of future cases presenting a repetition of the historical facts to which the
law has been applied”).
23 See infra Section III.A.
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to appellate review, not hidden within an isolated verdict delivered by
laypeople. Acceptance of that proposition means that the role of the judge
and jury should depend not on a distinction between methodology and
conclusion but on the distinction between the general and the specific. The
reliability that Daubert, Joiner, and Rule 702 all require the judge to
determine as a preliminary fact entails assessing every aspect of scientific
evidence, not just its methodology or some other subset of the testimony.
At the same time, the general–specific distinction that derives from the
nature of scientific inference also means that, whether they involve
methods or conclusions, factual disputes that relate solely to the case at
hand are for the jury to assess. Thus, whether an expert in the instant case
actually applied the methodology that the judge found valid generally is a
matter of weight, as is any conclusion the expert reaches that is applicable
only to the litigants. The only caveat here is the traditional one that the
judge may keep these issues from the jury when no rational jury could
credit the expert’s assertions about them.24
Hence, for example, in the controversial area of “shaken baby
syndrome,”25 an expert’s assertion that research indicates that subdural
hematoma, retinal bleeding, and brain swelling are indicative of child abuse
is a general proposition and a matter of admissibility; an expert’s assertion
that the victim in the case had this triad of symptoms, however, is a casespecific assertion and thus a matter of weight.26 Likewise, in a case
involving testimony about DNA, the assertion that a particular method of
testing DNA is reliable is of general import and a matter of admissibility,
while an opinion regarding a case-specific fact, such as whether the
technician properly labeled the samples prior to performing the analysis, is
a matter of weight. An expert economist in an employment discrimination
case who admittedly fails to control for a key variable such as seniority or
wage structure in a regression analysis has committed a general error that
should lead to exclusion by a judge; but determining whether the economist
24 As we discuss in more detail below, see infra text accompanying notes 122–24, evidence codes
require that even preliminary facts that go to the jury must still meet a “conditional relevance”
threshold, such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the fact is true. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
25 Compare Sandeep K. Narang et al., A Daubert Analysis of Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken Baby
Syndrome—Part II: An Examination of the Differential Diagnosis, 13 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
203, 207 (2013) (finding that the science in this area is fundamentally sound), with Keith A. Findley et
al., Shaken Baby Syndrome, Abusive Head Trauma, and Actual Innocence: Getting it Right, 12 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 209, 213 (2012) (finding that the science in this area is fundamentally unsound).
26 See generally Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome and
the Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2009) (exploring the application of the general science of
diagnosing shaken baby syndrome to specific cases involving defendants charged with shaking babies
to death). But see Joëlle Anne Moreno & Brian Holmgren, Dissent into Confusion: The Supreme Court,
Denialism, and the False “Scientific” Controversy Over Shaken Baby Syndrome, 2013 UTAH L. REV.
153.
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who asserts such a variable was included in the analysis did in fact include
it, or whether he or she obtained accurate information about the variable, is
an assessment that should be carried out by the jury.
In addition to its consistency with the nature of scientific evidence,
this approach to the admissibility–weight issue in expert testimony cases
has three important benefits. First, it aligns squarely with the purposes of
evidence codes and the Constitution’s due process and right to jury
provisions by making optimal use of the relative competencies of judges
and juries.27 Juries will be prevented from hearing unreliable evidence, and
at the same time (assuming the expert testimony is admitted) they will be
given full authority to decide facts relevant to the case before them.
Second, the division suggested by the structure of scientific inference
implements the key goal—again one echoed, albeit faintly, in both
constitutional and evidentiary jurisprudence—of ensuring uniformity
between cases regarding general propositions of science.
Finally, this approach has the benefit of clarity. The current focus on
methodology–conclusions leaves courts in a quandary because, as a
scientific matter, methodology and conclusions are not separable. The
alternative we propose is more straightforward: when the statement of fact
(or inference) that is asserted to support proffered expert opinion
transcends the instant case, it is a preliminary fact to be decided by the
court under Rule 104(a). When the statement of fact (or inference) that is
asserted to support proffered expert opinion is pertinent only in the instant
case (after a judge has found that it is the product of reliable principles and
methods), it is a question of weight and only subject to review under Rule
104(b) as a matter of conditional relevance.
More formally, therefore, we propose the following test to identify the
boundary between a judge’s obligation to determine admissibility and the
jury’s task to assess weight:
Preliminary facts that describe the principles or methods of scientific research
or generally applicable conclusions drawn therefrom are within the judge’s
responsibility to decide as a matter of admissibility under Federal Rule of
Evidence 104(a) and equivalent state rules. Conditional facts that describe
whether the expert adhered to a reliable principle or method are matters of
weight and within the province of the trier of fact to decide if a reasonable
trier of fact could find that the fact is true, as provided in Federal Rule of
Evidence 104(b).

This preliminary fact test requires the judge to evaluate whether the
expert’s conclusions validly derive from reliable research methods and

27
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principles, leaving as a conditional fact for the jury the assessment of
whether methods and principles the judge has found reliable were in fact
applied by the expert as he or she claims (and also, by negative inference,
allowing the jury to evaluate the credibility of any expert conclusions that
are not “generally applicable” but rather specific only to the parties in the
case).
Another important implication of a regime that aligns admissibility
decisions about expertise with the structure of scientific inference is that
appellate courts must also modify their approach to expert evidence.
Because trial judge decisions about scientific reliability are general in
nature and are relevant to more than just the case before them, the
deference accorded trial courts with respect to case-specific trial findings
intrinsic to the case is not appropriate in this setting. We argue that, in
contrast to current law directing appellate courts to apply the abuse of
discretion standard to trial court decisions applying Daubert,28 appellate
review of such decisions should be more rigorous, akin to how appellate
courts review determinations of law made by trial courts.29
This Article establishes the basis for these proposals by describing the
origins of the legal distinction between methodology and conclusions in
Daubert as well as the present state of confusion surrounding that
distinction. It then seeks to bring the evidentiary rules in line with the
structure of science. Part I provides a brief historical overview of how the
issue arose in Daubert and the lower courts’ failure to resolve it. Part II
explores the values and principles that underlie the judge–jury division
regarding fact-finding, both under the Constitution and the rules of
evidence. Part III then describes the primary contribution of the Article by
explicating the structure of scientific inference and explaining how the
roles of the judge and the jury can be aligned with that structure in light of
constitutional and evidentiary principles. Part IV observes how these
insights about scientific reasoning enhance the authority of the appellate
court to override the trial court’s admissibility decision. The Conclusion
summarizes our views.
I.

THE GENESIS OF THE METHODOLOGY–CONCLUSIONS DISTINCTION

A fundamental component of the law of evidence is the primary
obligation of the judge to decide admissibility, an obligation which,
28 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997) (adopting the abuse of discretion standard of
review of trial judge determinations under Daubert).
29 Several commentators have reached the same conclusion, see infra note 194, but we are the first
to put forward this rationale, which provides a uniform theory applying to both the trial and appellate
contexts.
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counterintuitively, very often requires the judge to be a factfinder.30 The
hearsay exclusions and exceptions are particularly clear illustrations of this
judicial duty. A “coconspirator’s statement” is only admissible if it was
“made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.”31 An “excited utterance” requires, among other things, that
“the declarant was under the stress of excitement” that caused the statement
to be made.32 And “dying declarations,” among other requirements, must be
made under a belief of “imminent” death.33 Under the federal rules, these
are all factual determinations that must be decided by judges under Rule
104(a).
In the landmark Daubert decision about scientific testimony, the Court
adhered to this conventional approach of defining the judge’s admissibility
responsibilities in terms of a preliminary factual inquiry.34 The Court found
that Rule 702 required trial courts to evaluate the reliability and validity of
the basis for proffered expert testimony.35 The admissibility assessment
under Rule 702 thus hinges, the Court stated, on a preliminary fact under
Rule 104(a) involving the soundness of the science being offered in court.36
“Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony,” the Court declared,
“the trial judge must determine at the outset . . . whether the expert is
proposing to testify [about] scientific knowledge.”37
The Daubert Court’s ruling that scientific validity constitutes a
preliminary fact under Rule 702, while not surprising as a general

30 See generally GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J. DUANE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE:
RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND AUTHORITY § 104.2, at 56 (7th ed. 2011) (noting
that preliminary questions to be decided by the judge include “the qualifications of a person to be a
witness,” “the existence of a privilege,” and “any other question pertaining to the admissibility of some
testimony or other evidence (e.g., whether a hearsay statement is admissible under some exception to
the hearsay rules)” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 104(a))).
31 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
32 FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
33 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
34 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993) (“Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial
judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a) . . . [that] the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and [that] that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue.” (footnotes omitted)).
35 The Daubert Court explicitly refused to equate the “validity test” of Rule 702 that is imposed on
federal courts with the test associated with Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), which
requires that judges determine whether the scientific technique or method on which scientific testimony
is based is “generally accepted” in the particular field from which it comes. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
However, some jurisdictions continue to subscribe to the Frye rule; thus, it is worth noting that general
acceptance is also a “preliminary fact” that must be decided as a component of an admissibility
determination, and that our analysis would also apply in a Frye jurisdiction. See infra text
accompanying notes 106–13.
36 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
37 Id.
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evidentiary matter, generated a second issue that is largely unique to
scientific evidence: What is the proper focus of the validity assessment to
be made by judges? In ordinary evidentiary contexts, the preliminary facts
judges must find when applying evidentiary rules are plainly defined and
unique to the respective case. Whether a statement was made “in
furtherance of the conspiracy” or a declaration was uttered “under the stress
of excitement” are straightforward factual inquiries and do not have
relevance outside of the case at hand. In contrast, the preliminary fact at
issue in Daubert was whether the methods and principles of years of
scientific research and numerous published studies support expert
testimony that Bendectin is a teratogen that causes birth defects when
ingested by people like the plaintiff’s mother.38 This is not a
straightforward factual inquiry or one that arises only in the case at hand.
Thus, the precise scope of the preliminary fact or facts judges must decide
in connection with scientific evidence is not as easily discerned as in runof-the-mill cases involving hearsay and the like.
The Daubert Court did not delve into this nuance. Rather it simply
stated that, for the judge applying Rule 702, the “overarching subject is the
scientific validity—and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of
the principles that underlie a proposed submission.”39 Using language
suggesting that the point was obvious, the Court then added, “The focus, of
course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the
conclusions that they generate.”40 The Court offered no further elaboration.
In particular, it did not differentiate between conclusions that have general
application and conclusions relevant only to the parties in the case, despite
the fact that the assertion that Bendectin can cause birth defects is
fundamentally different from an assertion that the plaintiff’s birth defects
were caused by Bendectin.
Courts and commentators intent on limiting the scope of Daubert
seized on the Court’s distinction between principles and methodology on
the one hand and conclusions on the other.41 At first take, this latter division
might seem appealing. On the practical level, the distinction appears to be
an administrable means of dividing the responsibility for evaluating
scientific evidence: methods are the procedures scientists use to study a
phenomenon and conclusions are the facts about the world those methods
38

See id. at 582–85.
Id. at 594–95.
40 Id. at 595.
41 See,
e.g., Kenneth J. Chesebro, Taking Daubert’s “Focus” Seriously: The
Methodology/Conclusion Distinction, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1745, 1745–53 (1994) (making this
distinction).
39
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reveal. On a conceptual level, the methodology–conclusions demarcation
seems attractive because it mirrors the procedure–substance distinction that
pervades legal analysis and is generally thought to describe the respective
duties of the judge and the jury.42
However, this seemingly innocuous sentence in Daubert hides a deep
conflict with the scientific enterprise. Admittedly, the methodology–
conclusions distinction is well recognized in science. Indeed, the
conventional scheme for organizing scientific articles is to divide them into
sections according to background (i.e., introduction), methods, results, and
discussion (i.e., conclusions).43 But both the results and the conclusions
drawn from those results are highly dependent on and interactive with the
methods used. Even if the methods are reliable, in the sense that they
repeatedly produce the same results, the discussion section of a scientific
article often recognizes that the findings may be suspect because certain
variables were not taken into account, or might have been different had
other methods been used, or are only applicable in narrow sets of
circumstances or, while statistically significant, indicate only a small
overall effect on the dependent variable.44 In assessing the usefulness of
empirical data for a specific legal purpose, methods, principles, results, and
conclusions are irretrievably linked.
For the same reason, the methodology–conclusions dichotomy is
inimical to Daubert’s own agenda. For instance, if the judge merely has to
decide whether a given methodology is valid in the abstract, an expert
witness in a toxic tort case who can show he or she relied on well42 SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 131, 141 (1988) (explaining that juries are treated as “passive
recipients of information” and the judge as a “master of ceremonies”).
43 This structure can be found in virtually any article published in the scientific journals Science,
Neuron, and Law & Human Behavior, for instance.
44 As one example of the interrelationship between statistical methods and legally relevant
conclusions, consider the controversy over the Implicit Association Test (IAT), a social psychological
instrument designed to measure the strength of associations between concepts (e.g., whites, AfricanAmericans) and evaluations (e.g., good, bad) or stereotypes (e.g., athletic, criminal) that are outside a
person’s conscious awareness. The IAT has been proffered by expert witnesses for the plaintiffs in
employment discrimination class action litigation as evidence of “unconscious bias.” E.g., Pippen v.
State, No. LACL107038, 2012 WL 1388902 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Apr. 17, 2012), aff’d, 854 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa
2014). However, critics argue that “the low IAT–criterion correlations . . . counsel strongly against the
assumption that scores on the race and ethnicity IATs reflect individual differences in propensity to
discriminate.” Frederick L. Oswald et al., Predicting Ethnic and Racial Discrimination: A MetaAnalysis of IAT Criterion Studies, 105 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 171, 187 (2013). Proponents
of the IAT counter that only approximately “4% of variance in discrimination-relevant criterion
measures is predicted by Black–White race IAT measures,” but argue that “[t]his level of correlational
predictive validity of IAT measures represents potential for discriminatory impacts with very
substantial societal significance.” Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Statistically Small Effects of the Implicit
Association Test Can Have Societally Large Effects, 108 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 553, 560
(2015).
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conducted in vivo animal studies about the substance alleged to have
caused the plaintiff’s illness might be allowed to testify to that conclusion,
regardless of whether such studies have a reasonable connection with the
expert’s opinion.45 Moreover, leaving to the jury an assessment of every
expert “conclusion”—including those that are generally applicable, such as
the expert’s opinion in Daubert that, as the Court put it, “Bendectin can
cause birth defects”46—effectively relinquishes the judicial gatekeeper role
the Court sought to establish. Both of these results run counter to Daubert’s
central goal of ensuring the reliability of expert testimony through a
judicial gatekeeper.
In any event, the Court quickly decided that the line dividing
methodology and conclusions was arbitrary and that employing it largely
eviscerated the gatekeeping function set out in Daubert. Just four years
later, the Court returned to the issue in General Electric Co. v. Joiner.47 In
Joiner, the plaintiff claimed that his exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs) while employed as an electrician had enhanced the onset of his
lung cancer.48 The trial court granted summary judgment after excluding
the plaintiff’s experts, on the ground that their testimony linking PCBs and
small-cell lung cancer “did not rise above ‘subjective belief or unsupported
speculation.’”49 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit reversed, finding that the lower court had erroneously “excluded the
experts’ testimony because it ‘drew different conclusions from the research
than did each of the experts.’”50 According to the Court of Appeals, “a
district court should limit its role to determining the ‘legal reliability of
proffered expert testimony, leaving the jury to decide the correctness of
competing expert opinions.’”51 The Eleventh Circuit thus relied on the
methodology–conclusions distinction for assigning admissibility and
weight.
On appeal, the principal issue addressed by the Supreme Court was
the standard of review governing appellate court analysis of lower court

45

See Chesebro, supra note 41, at 1749.
509 U.S. 579, 583 (1993) (stating that the plaintiff’s expert “had concluded that Bendectin can
cause birth defects” and then describing the studies on which “[t]heir conclusions” were based
(emphasis added)).
47 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
48 Id. at 139–40 (“The suit alleged that his exposure to PCB’s ‘promoted’ his cancer; had it not
been for his exposure to these substances, his cancer would not have developed for many years, if at
all.”).
49 Id. at 140 (quoting Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1994)).
50 Id. at 141 (quoting Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 533 (11th Cir. 1996)).
51 Id. at 141 (quoting Joiner, 78 F.3d at 533).
46
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admissibility decisions, which the Court set at “abuse of discretion”52 (a
subject to which we return in Part IV). However, the Court also invested
considerable ink discussing the admissibility of the testimony proffered by
the plaintiff’s scientific experts. The plaintiff, operating under the
assumption that Daubert’s methodology–conclusions distinction controlled
the extent of the gatekeeping function, had argued in the lower courts that
the animal and epidemiological studies upon which his experts relied were
reasonable methods for reaching the conclusion that PCBs had enhanced
the onset of the plaintiff’s cancer.53 The Supreme Court registered
considerable chagrin over this claim, noting that, in effect, it would make
admissibility hinge on the validity of the experts’ methods in the abstract
rather than as they apply to the case at hand. For example, in regard to the
animal studies, the Court complained that the plaintiff “chose ‘to proceed
as if the only issue [was] whether animal studies can ever be a proper
foundation for an expert’s opinion.’”54 The majority categorically rejected
this pinched view of the gatekeeping function, stating: “Of course, whether
animal studies can ever be a proper foundation for an expert’s opinion was
not the issue. The issue was whether these experts’ opinions were
sufficiently supported by the animal studies on which they purported to
rely.”55 For the same reason, the Court also agreed with the district court’s
determination that the cited epidemiological studies failed to support the
experts’ conclusions.56
Even more tellingly, the Court backtracked from the language in
Daubert setting out the methodology–conclusions line of demarcation.
According to the majority:
[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.
Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. But nothing in
either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to
admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit
of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical
gap between the data and the opinion proffered.57

While the decision in Joiner thus unambiguously dismissed the notion
that methodology and conclusions are easily separable, it did not explicitly

52
53
54
55
56
57
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See id. at 140.
Id. at 144 (alteration in original) (quoting Joiner, 864 F. Supp. at 1324).
Id.
See id. at 145–46.
Id. at 146.
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hold that courts are required to recognize their nexus.58 Nor did it suggest a
concrete substitute for the methodology–conclusions demarcation. In 2000,
however, the amendments to Rule 702, meant to implement Daubert and
Joiner,59 sent a clearer message. The new Rule 702, restyled in 2011,
requires not only that expert testimony be helpful, as the old rule did, but
also directs the judge to find that “the testimony is based on sufficient facts
or data,” “that the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods,” and that the expert “has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.”60
This language codifies Joiner’s command that courts focus on
“whether these experts’ opinions were sufficiently supported” by the
research.61 It eschews the methodology–conclusions distinction—as well as
any distinction between these two aspects of the testimony and principles—
by not only requiring a determination that the expert’s methods and
principles are reliable but also that they are reliably applied “to the facts of
the case.”62 Bringing home this point, the Advisory Committee note to Rule
702 in the 2000 revisions points out that, while the fact that experts
disagree about a scientific issue should obviously not be automatic grounds
for exclusion, a conclusion by an expert that is at odds with those reached
by most others in the field can be a reasonable indication that the expert has
not reliably applied the relevant principles and methods.63 The new Rule’s
language and the Advisory Committee’s note make clear that the
conclusions the expert reaches about the case—at least those that apply
generally to other cases—must be found reliable to be admissible.

58

The Court did not directly address the issue but rather insisted, throughout the opinion, that the
trial judge has significant discretion in making the admissibility decision.
59 The rules were also meant to codify the third case in what has been called the Daubert trilogy,
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), which applied Rule 702 to all types of expert
testimony. See Weissenberg & Duane, supra note 30, § 702.4, at 458 (stating that the requirements
noted in the text “were added to the Rule in 2000, codifying the Supreme Court’s holdings in
Daubert . . . and its progeny” (footnotes omitted)).
60 FED. R. EVID. 702.
61 522 U.S. at 144.
62 FED. R. EVID. 702(d).
63 The Advisory Committee first quotes Joiner’s statement that “conclusions and methodology are
not entirely distinct from one another” and then states that “when an expert purports to apply principles
and methods in accordance with professional standards, and yet reaches a conclusion that other experts
in the field would not reach, the trial court may fairly suspect that the principles and methods have not
been faithfully applied.” FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (first quoting
Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146; and then citing Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir.
1996)).
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Yet not all lower courts have received the message. While some courts
have taken to heart the change in focus signaled by Joiner and Rule 702,64
many other courts, perhaps most, continue to insist on the methodology–
conclusions distinction when determining whether an expert evidentiary
proposition goes to admissibility or weight.65 Still others, especially at the
state level or in certain types of cases, appear to be oblivious to the entire
issue.66
The lower courts are not entirely at fault for this confusion. Given the
complex nature of scientific evidence, an unambiguous dividing line that
transcends the methodology–conclusions distinction is not immediately
apparent. Nor has the Supreme Court, the Federal Rules, or commentators
yet offered a clear conceptual basis for making the necessary distinctions.
The rest of this Article seeks to remedy this situation.
II. PREMISES THAT INFORM THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
The beginning of the inquiry into the proper role of judge and jury in
scientific evidence cases requires a recognition of two fundamental aspects
64 See, e.g., Savage v. Union Pac. R.R., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1028 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (“Daubert’s
standard of admissibility ‘extends to each step in an expert’s analysis all the way through the step that
connects the work of the expert to the particular case.’ Thus, if the expert’s conclusion—or any
inferential link that undergirds it—fails under Daubert to provide any evidence of causation, it must be
excluded . . . .” (citation omitted) (quoting In re Conrail Toxic Tort FELA Litig., Nos. CIV. A 94-11J,
CIV. A 94-4J, 1998 WL 465897, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1998))).
65 See, e.g., City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2014);
Schultz v. Akzo Nobel Paints, LLC, 721 F.3d 426, 431 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he key to the gate . . . is the
soundness and care with which the expert arrived at her opinion: the inquiry must ‘focus . . . solely on
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate.’ So long as the principles and
methodology reflect reliable scientific practice, ‘[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of
attacking shaky but admissible evidence.’” (second ellipsis in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595–96 (1993))); Baker Valley Lumber, Inc. v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 813 A.2d 409, 416 (N.H. 2002) (“The proper focus for the trial court is the
reliability of the expert’s methodology or technique. The trial court functions only as a gatekeeper,
ensuring a methodology’s reliability before permitting the fact-finder to determine the weight and
credibility to be afforded an expert’s testimony.” (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–95)); see also David
E. Bernstein & Eric G. Lasker, Defending Daubert: It’s Time to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 7 (2015) (“Although many courts have faithfully applied amended Rule
702, the same divisions that existed in the courts prior to 2000 continue to exist today—and on the very
same issues that the Judicial Conference sought to resolve.”).
66 See, e.g., J.H.H. v. State, 897 So. 2d 419, 422 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (“Daubert does not require
the accuracy of the testing in the particular case to be assessed at the admissibility stage.” (quoting
Turner v. State, 746 So. 2d. 355, 360 (Ala. 1998))); State v. Pesqueira, 333 P.3d 797, 802 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2014) (“[Q]uestions about the accuracy and reliability of a witness’ factual basis, data, and
methods go to the weight and credibility of the witness’ testimony and are questions of fact . . . .”
(quoting Pipher v. Loo, 212 P.3d 91, 96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009))); see also Bernstein & Lasker, supra
note 65, at 8 (“[A] number of courts have simply ignored the Rule 702 amendment, relying instead on
Daubert case law prior to the amendment or even on case law prior to Daubert itself.”).
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of our legal system. First, as both the common law and all evidence codes
make clear, judges are the principal arbiters of when evidence is
admissible.67 Second, most courts and evidence scholars agree that, in
carrying out this role and interpreting the multitude of provisions that
implement it, judges should be governed by one simple principle: all
relevant evidence should be heard by the jury unless there is a good reason
to keep it out, such as a concern that it is unfairly prejudicial, misleading, a
waste of time, deceptive, redundant, or unreliable.68
At the start, then, it is necessary to identify how this basic principle
informs the law’s reception of scientific evidence in the courtroom. When,
if ever, may the judge keep such evidence from the jury? Here we look first
at what the Constitution has to say about this issue, and then examine the
various approaches found in evidence jurisprudence. Both sources provide
some insight into the relative role of judges and juries in scientific evidence
cases. But ultimately neither source provides satisfactory guidance on the
central concern we are addressing.
A. Constitutional Considerations
The Rules of Evidence must be interpreted against the basic
guarantees of the Constitution. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
guarantee due process for those whom the government seeks to deprive of
life, liberty, and property—language that has been interpreted to require the
government to treat litigants, and especially criminal defendants, fairly.69
The Sixth and Seventh Amendments guarantee the right to a jury trial in
criminal and civil cases, respectively,70 and the Sixth Amendment also
guarantees a criminal defendant the right “to be confronted with the
witnesses against him” and “to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor.”71 This second set of provisions states that criminal

67 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The Court must decide any preliminary question about
whether . . . evidence is admissible.”).
68 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 402 (“Relevant evidence is admissible, unless any of the following
provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; these rules; or other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court.”).
69 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . . .”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”).
70 The Sixth Amendment, in relevant part, provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed.” Id. amend. VI. The Seventh Amendment guarantees that “[i]n
Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.” Id. amend. VII.
71 Id. amend. VI.
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defendants and civil litigants have a right to have their cases determined by
a jury,72 and that criminal defendants have a right to rebut and present
evidence relevant to their case.73 Thus, with respect to the judge’s role in
assessing the reliability of scientific evidence, the Constitution could be
said to require that the judge monitor carefully the government’s evidence,
and at the same time ensure that nongovernmental parties, and in particular
criminal defendants, can present their full cases to a panel of laypeople.74
We will not attempt a full exploration of the extent to which the
Supreme Court has adopted this interpretation. Only enough will be said
here to make clear that the Court’s constitutional decisions have not
succeeded in clearly demarcating the role of the judge from the role of the
jury. While some of the Court’s cases take the view that the Constitution
imposes few constraints on expert testimony, others indicate that reliability
and the effect of the testimony on lay jurors are constitutionally relevant
considerations. The end result is a very blurry picture of how the
Constitution affects the division of responsibility between judges and juries
in cases involving scientific evidence.
In Barefoot v. Estelle,75 the Court was confronted with a type of
scientific evidence—regarding predictions of violence—that it conceded
was error-ridden.76 Yet it held that the guarantees of the Due Process
Clause and the Eighth Amendment do not prevent the prosecution from
submitting such evidence to the jury, even in a capital case.77 On the
reliability issue, the Court simply stated: “The suggestion that no
psychiatrist’s testimony may be presented with respect to a defendant’s

72 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (recognizing the right to jury trial in state
criminal cases). The Seventh Amendment has not been applied to the states, Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
189, 192 n.6 (1974), but most states recognize the jury right in civil cases, David A. Anderson, First
Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 755, 793 (2004) (noting that “almost all”
states guarantee a right to jury trial in civil cases).
73 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1967) (recognizing right to compulsory process in
state criminal cases); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (recognizing right of confrontation in
state criminal cases).
74 Cf. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (holding that the Confrontation Clause requires the
prosecution to demonstrate that hearsay has “adequate ‘indicia of reliability’”), abrogated by Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment’s Lost Clause: Unearthing
Compulsory Process, 2002 WISC. L. REV. 1275, 1278 (arguing, based on an historical analysis of the
Confrontation Clause and the Due Process Clause, that “relevant evidence offered by the accused
should be admitted as long as the prosecution can test the reliability of that evidence with the tools of
the adversary process”).
75 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
76 Id. at 901 (noting, and accepting arguendo, that “[n]either petitioner nor the [American
Psychiatric] Association suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future
dangerousness, only most of the time”).
77 Id. at 903.
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future dangerousness is somewhat like asking us to disinvent the wheel.”78
And the majority was also unconcerned about the possibility the jury would
misuse the information. Rather, it stated, “We are unconvinced . . . that the
adversary process cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from the
unreliable evidence and opinion about future dangerousness, particularly
when the convicted felon has the opportunity to present his own side of the
case.”79
Barefoot implies that the Constitution does not place significant
restrictions on scientifically suspect evidence. In Rock v. Arkansas,80 the
Court at first glance appeared to reinforce that stance by holding that the
Constitution sometimes bars attempts by the state to exclude scientifically
weak testimony, at least when it is presented by a criminal defendant. In
Rock, the defendant wanted to introduce statements she had made under
hypnosis.81 While the case did not involve expert testimony, it did involve
the use of an interview method that, the Court itself recognized, scientists
consider vulnerable to both conscious manipulation and unconscious
production of erroneous statements.82 Nonetheless, the Court concluded
that, given defendants’ constitutional rights to testify and present witnesses
on their behalf, defendants cannot be absolutely barred from presenting
such evidence, unless the state can show that it “is always so untrustworthy
and so immune to the traditional means of evaluating credibility that it
should disable a defendant from presenting her version of the events for
which she is on trial.”83
Three observations caution against giving Rock’s liberal treatment of
suspect science a broad reading, however. First, Rock alluded favorably to
the existence of “procedural safeguards” associated with the use of
hypnosis, suggesting that some methodological constraints are
permissible.84 Second, the holding is clearly bottomed on the strong
protection the Constitution affords criminal defendants;85 reasonable
restrictions on scientific evidence presented by the prosecution or civil
litigants are unlikely to be struck down by the Court. Finally, two
subsequent Supreme Court decisions indicate that Rock may be limited to
78

Id. at 896.
Id. at 901.
80 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
81 Id. at 46–47.
82 Id. at 60 (recognizing “the unreliability that hypnosis concededly may introduce”).
83 Id. at 61.
84 Id. at 60 (after noting the problems with hypnosis, stating “[t]he inaccuracies the process
introduces can be reduced, although perhaps not eliminated, by the use of procedural safeguards”).
85 See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (“Few rights are more fundamental than
that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense.”).
79
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rules affecting the right of defendants to testify, meaning that rules that
restrict expert testimony proffered by criminal defendants can still pass
constitutional muster.
In the first of these decisions, United States v. Scheffer,86 the defendant
sought to admit the results of a polygraph test that would have supported
his testimony at trial that he did not knowingly use drugs.87 The
government objected that the relevant evidence provisions established a per
se rule excluding polygraph evidence.88 Consistent with the reasoning in
Rock, the defendant claimed in response that such a rule violated the Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights “to a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense,” and “to present polygraph evidence to bolster his
credibility.”89
The Scheffer Court rejected the defendant’s argument, finding that
“[a] defendant’s right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but
rather is subject to reasonable restrictions.”90 Among other legitimate
interests, the Court highlighted the government’s need to ensure that “only
reliable evidence is introduced at trial.”91 The Court emphasized that “the
exclusion of unreliable evidence is a principal objective of many
evidentiary rules.”92 Applying this basic principle to the case at hand, the
Court found that the government had reasonably concluded that polygraph
tests, as a general matter, were unsound.93 Moreover, the Court noted that
the unreliability of the test itself (separate from the issue of its reliability in
the Scheffer case) was a valid constitutional basis for exclusion.94
Similarly, in Clark v. Arizona95 the Court upheld a state court rule that
prohibits criminal defendants from presenting psychiatric opinion
testimony on whether the defendant had the mens rea for the charged crime

86

523 U.S. 303 (1998).
Id. at 306.
88 Id. at 306–07 (citing MIL. R. EVID. 707).
89 Id. at 307 n.3 (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)).
90 Id. at 308.
91 Id. at 309.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 312 (“[The government’s approach] is a rational and proportional means of advancing the
legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence.”).
94 Id. (“[T]here is simply no way to know in a particular case whether a polygraph examiner’s
conclusion is accurate, because certain doubts and uncertainties plague even the best polygraph
exams.”).
95 548 U.S. 735 (2006).
87
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(while still allowing such testimony on the insanity issue).96 Quoting from
its own precedent, the Court stated:
While the Constitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under
rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends
that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit
trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain
other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to
mislead the jury.97

After recounting reasons why testimony from mental health professionals
can be speculative, the Court asserted that “these empirical and conceptual
problems add up to a real risk that an expert’s judgment in giving capacity
evidence will come with an apparent authority that psychologists and
psychiatrists do not claim to have.”98
In short, even in cases where a criminal defendant proffers the expert
testimony, the Constitution permits states to create a division between
judge and jury for purposes of determining admissibility and weight.
Perhaps because of a desire to avoid constitutionalizing evidence law,99
however, the Court’s cases addressing the admissibility of expert testimony
provide little guidance on where the line should be drawn. In particular,
these cases devote no attention to the possible benefits of basing the
division, as we propose, on the extent to which the testimony is based on
general propositions. While, as we note in Part III, constitutional decisions
in other domains have signaled some appreciation for the general–specific
distinction in connection with factual determinations,100 the Court’s
decisions regarding evidence and preliminary fact questions are silent on
this point. Rather, these latter decisions have left resolution of this issue to
the rules of evidence.

96 Id. at 779; see also id. at 745 (describing the Arizona rule at issue as one established in State v.
Mott, 931 P.2d 1046 (Ariz. 1997)).
97 Id. at 770 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326 (2006)).
98 Id. at 778. This language stands in remarkable contrast to the holding in Barefoot, which ignored
Justice Blackmun’s dissent making the identical point in arguing against the admission of expert
prediction testimony presented by the prosecution. See Barefoot v. Estelle 463 U.S. 880, 929 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“One can only wonder how juries are to separate valid from invalid expert
opinions when the ‘experts’ themselves are so obviously unable to do so.”).
99 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (“A statement . . . might be proved to be
quite unreliable, but this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum, see, e.g., Fed.
Rule Evid. 601, and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ‘The aim of the
requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental
unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.’” (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219,
236 (1941))).
100 See infra text accompanying notes 138–43.
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B. Evidentiary Considerations
Evidence codes and the decisions that construe them have provided
more guidance on the admissibility–weight issue than the Court’s
constitutional cases have, but as our earlier account of judicial confusion
over the methodology–conclusions distinction revealed, they still leave
much to be desired on this score. The primary focus of evidence
jurisprudence in this area, as in many others, has been on the relative ability
of the judge and jury to decide preliminary facts.101 Where the preliminary
fact involves empirical evidence, the need to ensure consistency across
cases has also occasionally been a concern, but clearly a secondary one that
has not focused on the general–specific distinction we propose.
As Professor Edward Imwinkelried has explained, even when expert
testimony is not involved, evidence law has long been conflicted on the
proper roles of judge and jury.102 During colonial times, American judges
followed the English practice of having judges make decisions about
preliminary facts.103 Beginning in the nineteenth century, however, some
courts allowed the jury to reconsider the judge’s admissibility decision, at
least when the judge admitted the evidence.104 This practice became more
formalized in the second third of the twentieth century when many courts,
apparently influenced by Professor Edmund Morgan’s work, permitted
most types of preliminary facts to get to the jury under a theory of
“conditional relevance.”105 As applied by these courts, this theory relegated
the role of the judge to deciding, often without hearing any proffer from the
opponent of the evidence, whether “the foundational evidence has

101 We are aware that the term “preliminary facts” contains some ambiguity. In general, in the
evidentiary context it refers to all facts that underlie or are prefatory to admissibility decisions. Under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, some of these facts are labeled “preliminary facts” and are controlled by
Rule 104(a). As discussed in the text, such facts must be found by a preponderance of the evidence.
Other preliminary, or prefatory, facts are treated as “conditional” under Rule 104(b). A judge’s
obligation toward conditional facts is limited to ensuring that a reasonable trier of fact could find them
to exist. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary
Facts Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 577, 579 (1984)
(“In the parlance of preliminary factfinding, the issue of a theory’s validity is a question of conditional
relevance, in which the judge’s limited role is to determine whether, as a matter of law, the proponent
has presented evidence with sufficient probative value to support a rational jury finding that the fact
exists.”).
102 See id.
103 Id. at 584 (“[In colonial times, v]irtually universal agreement existed that the judge was the final
arbiter of preliminary fact questions.”).
104 See JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 221–22
(1947) (describing one such case).
105 Edmund Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Questions
of Fact, 43 HARV. L. REV. 165, 169 (1929) (arguing that “where the relevancy of A depends upon the
existence of B, the existence of B should normally be for the jury”).
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sufficient probative value as a matter of law to support a rational jury
finding of the preliminary fact’s existence.”106
The courts’ approach to preliminary facts in cases involving scientific
evidence followed the same paths. Prior to Daubert, the rule in Frye v.
United States,107 which focused on the general acceptability of the basis of
the expert’s testimony,108 dominated. Under that rule, the judge determined
the preliminary fact of general acceptance.109 This practice was based
largely on concern about the jury’s ability to handle expert evidence.110 A
second, less frequently mentioned, rationale for Frye and the strong judicial
role regarding its application was concern about consistency across cases.
For instance, in People v. Kelly,111 the decision that adopted Frye in
California, the California Supreme Court stated that the general acceptance
test would “promote a degree of uniformity of decision.”112 However,
application of the general acceptance test was haphazard and did not seem
to depend on a close examination of the scientific opinion’s generality in
the way we propose.113
Moreover, beginning in the 1950s, a number of jurisdictions rejected
Frye on the ground that it was too restrictive and, beginning in the 1970s,
some also rejected it on the additional ground that it was inconsistent with
the original version of Rules 401, 403, and 702, stances that seemed to
permit admission of almost any relevant expert testimony that appeared to
assist the factfinder.114 Some courts in these jurisdictions specifically
adopted Professor Morgan’s conditional relevance approach in the expert
evidence context, which in effect meant that the judge’s role was limited to
determining whether, as a matter of law, a rational jury could find the
preliminary fact that formed the basis of the expert’s testimony was
106

Imwinkelried, supra note 101, at 594.
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
108 See id. at 1014.
109 See John William Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U.
ILL. L.F. 1, 10–11.
110
See id. at 4.
111 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
112 Id. at 1244–45; see also 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD L. IMWINKELRIED, JR., SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE § 1.06[a], at 18–19 (4th ed. 2007); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 1152 (Kenneth S.
Broun ed., 7th ed. 2013).
113 See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1211 (1980) (“It is unresolved whether the Frye standard
requires general acceptance of the scientific technique or of both the underlying principle and the
technique applying it.”).
114 For an account of the reaction to Frye as of 1980, including the impact of the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, see id. at 1228–31 (stating that “Frye may be tottering, but has not
yet fallen” and describing debates about whether Federal Rule 702 was consistent with or contrary to
Frye).
107
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scientifically valid.115 The assumption was that juries were capable of
assessing any relevant expert evidence that was not overly misleading.116
Of course, the Daubert revolution—consisting of Daubert, Joiner, and
the Supreme Court’s decision in Kumho Tire Company v. Carmichael,117
which made clear that Daubert applied to all varieties of expert
testimony—has significantly changed the landscape. Today, in the federal
courts and many state courts, the Daubert trilogy reigns.118 Even in states
that have not adopted Daubert, there is greater emphasis on evaluating the
reliability of scientific evidence and having judges play a gatekeeping role
on that issue.119
It is possible that this rejuvenation of judicial authority over
preliminary facts relating to expert testimony was also motivated in part by
a desire for consistency of determinations based on similar scientific
evidence.120 But if so, that goal was clearly secondary. As the discussion in
Part I indicated, the overriding impetus behind Daubert and its progeny
was the belief that the judge is the appropriate authority to evaluate
reliability as a preliminary fact because of the jury’s vulnerabilities. For
instance, the fear evidenced by the Court in Daubert itself was that a jury is
likely to be less able than a judge to evaluate whether the methodologies
associated with epidemiological studies are reliable and that, even if a jury

115 Imwinkelried, supra note 101, at 599 (citing State v. Kersting, 623 P.2d 1095, 1099–1100 (Or.
Ct. App. 1981)). There is also an argument that the language of Federal Rule of Evidence 901—
providing that in order “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence,
the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent
claims it is”—suggests that the proponent need merely make a plausible case of authenticity. Id. at 599–
600.
116 The best known defense of this position came from McCormick:
General scientific acceptance is a proper condition for taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but
it is not suitable as a determinant of the admissibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant
conclusions supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there are distinct
reasons for exclusion. These reasons are the familiar ones of prejudicing or misleading the jury or
consuming undue amounts of time.
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 112, § 203, at 1153–54 (footnotes omitted); accord McKay v.
State, 235 S.W.2d 173, 175 (Tex. Crim. App. 1950).
117 526 U.S. 137, 147–49 (1999).
118 See David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States,
44 JURIMETRICS 351, 355–56 (2004) (indicating that, as of 2004, most states had adopted Daubert or
interpreted their law consistently with Daubert); see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (2015).
119 See Bernstein & Jackson, supra note 118, at 355.
120 Compare Jay P. Kesan, An Autopsy of Scientific Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 84 GEO.
L.J. 1985, 2035 (1996) (“[A] principled validity standard that falls between the relevancy and Daubert
standards is only likely to lead to more confusion and less uniformity.”), with Goeb v. Tharaldson,
615 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000) (suggesting that, compared to Frye, Daubert had the effect of
undermining uniformity).
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decides they are not, it may have great difficulty disregarding conclusions
about causation that the expert says derive from them.121
Indeed, even in those jurisdictions that endorsed the jury-friendly
conditional relevance approach, commentators and courts agreed that the
judicial role with respect to preliminary facts ought to be strongly
influenced by whether the jury has the ability to give the preliminary fact in
question the weight it deserves. For instance, both Professor Morgan, the
rejuvenator of the conditional relevance approach, and the State of
California, which aggressively endorsed it,122 recognized that, as Professor
Imwinkelried puts it, “a critical factor is whether the jury can realistically
disregard the proffered evidence after finding the preliminary fact’s
nonexistence.”123 In some cases, such as determining whether a document is
authentic, the thought was that juries would have no difficulty with this
task: the jury would simply ignore a document it considered fake.124 In
contrast, using the example with which we started this Article, if jury
members were allowed to decide the preliminary fact of whether the death
of an out-of-court declarant was imminent, they might have great difficulty
ignoring the declarant’s statement during their deliberations, even when
they decide the declarant’s death was not imminent. The same type of
reasoning applies to preliminary facts associated with scientific evidence—
especially given their more complicated nature. Thus, courts in conditional
relevance jurisdictions had no trouble concluding that jurors are less likely
than a judge to recognize signs of scientific unreliability and that, even if
they do recognize such signs, they could easily fail to discount the rest of
the expert testimony accordingly.125
121 See 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (“We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge,
no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights
and innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence . . . .”).
Additionally, by investing the power over preliminary fact determinations in judges, Daubert and Rule
702 are consistent with the Supreme Court’s modern approach of giving trial courts substantial
managerial authority over their dockets. See David L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and the Birth
of Modernity: Managing Scientific Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 893, 921
(2013).
122 Imwinkelried, supra note 101, at 598 (“The California Evidence Code represents the most
extreme implementation of the conditional relevance concept.”).
123 Id. at 597.
124 This is the reasoning behind Rule 1008, which provides that “in a jury trial, the jury
determines . . . any issue [concerning] whether: (a) an asserted writing, recording, or photograph ever
existed; (b) another one produced at the trial or hearing is the original; or (c) other evidence of content
accurately reflects the content.” FED. R. EVID. 1008.
125 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Trial Judges—Gatekeepers or Usurpers? Can the Trial Judge
Critically Assess the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without Invading the Jury’s Province to
Evaluate the Credibility and Weight of the Testimony?, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 13–15 (2000) (noting that
laying the foundation for scientific evidence can often be a prolonged process that jurors will have
difficulty ignoring, especially given the degree of concentration required, and that the probabilistic
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In short, whether or not a jurisdiction follows Daubert, evidence law’s
approach to the preliminary fact issue has been strongly associated with
concern over jury capacity.126 Certainly, that worry is an important
consideration. Ultimately, however, an omnibus concern about the jury
does not provide enough nuance to determine which preliminary facts
about scientific evidence—whether they be methods, principles, or
conclusions—in which types of cases ought to be decided by the judge.
Given the complexities of scientific evidence and the differing capacities of
jurors, attempting to determine whether, in a particular case, specific facets
of scientific testimony are “too complicated” or “simple enough” for jury
consumption is probably not possible. In any event, even “simple”
evidence that is obviously flawed can be hard to disregard if it is powerful
enough, as the routine exclusion of coerced confessions,127 eyewitness
identifications made under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances,128 and
polygraph results129 suggests.
At bottom, while evidence law’s focus on the relative capacities of
judge and jury is important, it is of minimal help in deciding how to make
the division between admissibility and weight with respect to scientific
evidence. Judges are clearly meant to be gatekeepers, and juries are clearly
meant to be assessors of witness credibility.130 But the scope of the
gatekeeping function remains fuzzy. Fortunately, another frame, one that
takes jury and judicial competencies into account but is driven by the
nature of scientific evidence itself, is available.

nature of scientific research is harder to disregard than evidence the reliability of which is categorical in
nature).
126 It is worthwhile noting that this jury-incapacity rationale for allowing judges to determine the
preliminary facts associated with expert testimony undercuts the methodology–conclusions distinction
that Daubert recognized and that many courts still follow. Every aspect of scientific evidence—whether
it is methodology, principles, or conclusions—can be difficult to understand. To the extent the
distribution of power between judge and jury considers the ability of the jury to disregard unreliable
evidence, the distinction between method and conclusion is ephemeral.
127 See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (holding the admission of a coerced
confession cannot be harmless error, in part because “confessions have [a] profound impact on the
jury”).
128 See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113–14 (1977) (holding that “unnecessarily
suggestive” identification procedures should be excluded unless found to be reliable).
129 See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 314 (1998) (upholding a rule of per se exclusion of
polygraph evidence).
130 Renée McDonald Hutchins, You Can’t Handle the Truth! Trial Juries and Credibility,
44 SETON HALL L. REV. 505, 513–18 (2014) (describing how, by the early twentieth century, courts had
accepted the notion that juries are responsible for determining witness credibility).
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III. ALIGNING THE RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE
The constitutional decisions relevant to the distinction between
admissibility and weight do not answer the question we are seeking to
address; they merely pose it again as an inquiry into how to balance the
court’s duty to ensure evidence is reliable and the litigant’s rights to a jury
determination and voice. Evidentiary jurisprudence has been more helpful,
because it is better attuned to reliability concerns and the capacities of the
jury. Yet both the Supreme Court’s ruling in Joiner and the Federal Rules
have rejected the only concrete evidentiary proposal devised to date, which
provides that admissibility analysis should focus on methodology and
principles while the conclusions thereby derived should be a matter for the
jury.131 That distinction has been replaced by Rule 702, a superior but
nonetheless still vague provision requiring that judges gauge the reliability
of both the methods forming the basis for the testimony and the way in
which the conclusions are applied to the case at hand.
We think that Rule 702 expresses the correct approach. But it is not
specific enough. Here we propose a more precise method of determining
when preliminary facts about scientific evidence should be decided by the
judge, one that derives from the general nature of scientific knowledge and
how it applies to specific individual disputes. This proposal optimizes
reliability analysis, reserves for judges those admissibility issues that are
most akin to their role as guardians of the law, and ensures that juries are
involved in deciding all factual issues that are directly relevant to the
litigants and within their capacity as a lay evaluator of technical evidence.
A. The Structure of Scientific Evidence
The central question addressed in this Article is: When is an aspect of
expert scientific testimony a preliminary fact to be decided by the judge?
We think that this question cannot be answered without some
understanding of what the word “fact” means in scientific cases.
That inquiry begins with an examination of the seminal work of
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis. Professor Davis identified two kinds of
facts—what he termed “legislative facts” and “adjudicative facts”—that he
thought helped define the relative roles of judge and jury.132 Legislative
facts are facts that have relevance to legal reasoning and the fashioning of

131

See supra text accompanying notes 57–63.
Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (1942).
132
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legal rules.133 Adjudicative facts are relevant to the resolution of particular
cases.134 Davis stated that “[a]djudicative facts usually answer the questions
of who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent.”135 In
contrast, “[l]egislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties
but are general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and
policy and discretion.”136 As Davis stated, judges typically decide questions
of legislative fact, and adjudicative facts are usually within the province of
the trier of fact.137
Davis’s central insight is that the generality of the factual question can
have a major impact on the identity of the factfinder. In some contexts,
courts have also long understood this point. Consider, for instance, the
Supreme Court’s cases dealing with “constitutional facts.” Many of the
Court’s most famous cases involved such facts, including Brown v. Board
of Education,138 which found that black school children are negatively
affected by segregation,139 and Roe v. Wade,140 which addressed when a
fetus becomes “viable.”141 When, as in Brown and Roe, the Court finds
constitutionally relevant legislative facts, it almost certainly assumes that
other courts will abide by such findings even though they constitute “facts”
rather than “law.” A lower court would be regarded as a maverick if it
today concluded that African-American school children are not harmed by
segregation or if it ignored the Supreme Court’s definition of viability.
Indeed, in a rare explicit statement of this principle, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in the 1986 decision in Lockhart v. McCree,142 explained that
appellate courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, should not apply the
deferential “clearly erroneous” standard to legislative-fact findings by
lower courts, since lower courts might reach contrary conclusions on the
basis of the same scientific research.143
133 Id. at 402; see also FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee’s note (“Legislative facts . . . are
those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation
of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body.”).
134 Davis, supra note 132, at 402.
135 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 7.03, at 160 (3d ed. 1972).
136 Id.
137 See id.; see also Davis, supra note 132, at 402 (observing that the evidence rules for finding
facts that form the basis for creation of law and policy should differ from the rules for finding facts
specific to parties in a particular case).
138 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
139 Id. at 494.
140 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
141 Id. at 160, 162–64.
142 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
143 Id. at 168 n.3 (citing Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 748 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc)
(plurality opinion)).
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Thus, at least in constitutional cases, the Court appears to recognize
that general empirical propositions should apply in similarly situated cases
and that judges are obligated to ensure this is the case. But this insight has
usually not been applied in the preliminary fact setting, despite the reality
that this setting also requires figuring out whether the judge or the jury
should be the factfinder.
On the surface, the reason for this oversight is obvious: nothing about
the preliminary fact question in the run-of-the-mill, nonconstitutional case
is “general” in the sense contemplated by Davis’s definition of legislative
facts. Whether a particular declarant’s death is imminent or a particular
person is a coconspirator, for instance, is case-specific or, in Davis’s terms,
“adjudicative”; it has nothing to do with legal reasoning or policy (as
opposed to the rules making imminent death and participation in a
conspiracy relevant to hearsay analysis, which, of course, is a policy
decision). On first view, the same might be said for scientific evidence. For
instance, the ultimate fact in Daubert was whether the plaintiff’s birth
defects were more likely than not caused by his mother’s ingestion of the
defendant’s drug.144 Given the prevailing taxonomy as the Court would
have understood it, all expert testimony relevant to this issue would have
been deemed “adjudicative.” Nothing in the case had to do with “questions
of law and policy and discretion”—Davis’s definition of legislative facts—
as those terms are normally used.
Davis was not far off the mark, however. In a series of articles
published prior to Daubert, one of this Article’s authors and Professor
Laurens Walker built on Davis’s work and proposed a vision of courtroom
fact-finding that shows how his insights are, in fact, directly relevant to
cases like Daubert.145 Monahan and Walker argued that scientific evidence
presents a hybrid between legislative and adjudicative facts, a hybrid they
called “framework” facts.146 As Professors Monahan and Walker explained,
“a fundamental characteristic of much scientific research is that its
relevance has to be understood at two levels of generality, levels that are

144

509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993).
See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 488 (1986); Laurens Walker & John
Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 877, 879 (1988);
Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L.
REV. 559, 570 (1987).
146 Monahan and Walker used the term “social framework” because they were interested in
describing the use of social science research in court. Their approach, however, is broadly applicable to
all science used in court. To capture this idea, in our work we have used the more generic term
“empirical framework.” See Faigman, Monahan & Slobogin, supra note 18, at 423–24.
145
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analytically separate.”147 On the one hand, scientific knowledge “is a
product of research that applies generally to all similarly situated cases,
and, on the other, it is relevant to particular cases that might be instances of
the general findings.”148 Thus, applied science, by its nature, begins
generally—it transcends any particular courtroom—but in the courtroom it
provides a “framework” that must be applied to specific cases. Daubert, for
example, first presented the general framework question whether scientific
research supports a causal link between Bendectin and birth defects and,
second—assuming the first question was answered affirmatively—whether
the plaintiff’s birth defects were caused by Bendectin.149
In a recent article entitled Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in
Scientific Expert Testimony, we continued to explore the evidentiary
significance of this inherent division between the general and the specific
in applied science.150 As we explained in that article, “Fundamental
differences exist between how scientists describe phenomena as scientists
and how trial courts expect scientists to describe those phenomena.”151 On
the one hand, scientists “almost invariably measure phenomena at the
group level and describe their results statistically.”152 On the other hand,
trial courts “typically consider cases individually and call upon scientific
experts to describe their results categorically.”153 The challenge of
reasoning from group data in science to individual decisions in law is
usefully referred to as G2i. We argued that “the ‘G’ component of the G2i
analysis (what we call ‘framework’ evidence) is governed by different
admissibility standards than expert testimony aimed at addressing the ‘i’
component of that analysis (which we dub ‘diagnostic’ evidence).”154
Our article did not consider the perhaps more basic question of
whether any aspects of framework or diagnostic evidence should be
immune from admissibility analysis—that is, whether any facets of science
should be considered matters of weight rather than admissibility. Here we
propose, consistent with the position of both Professor Davis and
Professors Monahan and Walker, that because of their general nature, all
framework issues should always fall within the judge’s domain and thus be
a matter of admissibility under Rule 104(a) and equivalent state rules. Less
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
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obviously, while diagnostic facts should usually be reserved for the jury,
certain types of diagnostic facts should also be subject to gatekeeping by
the judge. The dividing line we propose depends entirely on whether the
statement of preliminary fact rests on preexisting research of general
applicability or instead is intrinsic to the case at hand.
The following sections elaborate on these proposals. They describe
four categories of science in an effort to align the requirements of
evidentiary rules with the basic nature of scientific reasoning. We propose
using these four categories to establish a bright-line division between the
judge’s responsibility to decide admissibility and the jury’s task to decide
weight.
B. Categories of Science
The four categories of science described here broadly reflect different
levels of scientific work, from highly theoretical to specifically applied.
While not every scientist would necessarily describe their discipline in the
way we do, we think these four categories are useful heuristics for thinking
about the wide varieties of scientific endeavor in a way that can be related
to the law’s evidentiary demands. We provide an overview of the
categories here, followed by a more detailed look.
Category 1, or Basic Science, is the systematic study of foundational
phenomena without an end product in mind. It is to be distinguished from
applied science, which seeks to develop a method, technology, or
application that can be used in daily life. Basic science involves the bigticket ideas in science—black holes in cosmology, general and special
relativity in physics, brain function in psychology or neuroscience, and
evolution in biology—that are the stuff of Nobel Prizes and similar
plaudits.
Category 2, or Framework Science (a label that borrows from our
earlier work), is applied science that aims at developing general
propositions about the world in a way that will have practical impact. This
category includes most of what scientists do day-to-day, usually in the
shadow of Category 1 theories or hypotheses. For example, Einstein’s
discovery of relativity, a Category 1 phenomenon, was the start of an
explosion of framework science, ranging from the principles underlying
global positioning devices to quantum physics.155

155 See Jesse Emspak, 8 Ways You Can See Einstein’s Theory of Relativity in Real Life,
LIVESCIENCE (Nov. 26, 2014, 11:55 AM), http://www.livescience.com/48922-theory-of-relativity-inreal-life.html [http://perma.cc/FR24-ZTKP].
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Category 3, or Diagnostic Science (another label borrowed from our
earlier work), is applied science that develops methods for determining
whether particular cases are instances of some general scientific
(framework) finding. Scientific research on the toxic effects of benzene
might demonstrate that at high enough doses it can cause leukemia. This is
a Category 2 issue. But creating a scientific methodology that would permit
a valid inference regarding whether particular cases of leukemia are
attributable to benzene exposure is a Category 3 endeavor. For example,
finding a particular set of gene mutations that cause leukemia and that are
specifically associated with benzene exposure would be such a diagnostic
method.
Finally, Category 4, or Application of Diagnostic Science, involves the
application of a diagnostic method or theory in a particular case. If sound
diagnostic methods exist (i.e., Category 3 considerations have been met),
Category 4 concerns whether the scientist used the validated methodology
in the case at hand and whether he or she did so properly. This category is
not research per se, but rather ensures, as any good scientist would want,
that the product of diagnostic research is used in the manner specified by
the research.
Again, the reason to develop these four categories is to implement two
basic insights, one from science and the other from law. The principal
insight from science is G2i, that is, scientists study phenomena at the group
level, and the ultimate legal issue is typically whether a particular case is an
instance of some relevant phenomenon. From law, the basic insight is that
judges have the constitutional and evidentiary responsibility to manage
systemic fact-finding, whereas juries are invested with the authority to
decide facts particular to the case. If the challenge with scientific evidence
is to identify a principled dividing line between the judge’s obligation to
decide admissibility and the jury’s task to assess weight, courts should seek
to identify a “cut-line” that inheres in the nature of scientific evidence itself
and conforms to the respective obligations of judge and jury.
These four categories of science help establish such a cut-line. Of the
four, three involve exclusively general empirical propositions that
transcend any one case. The findings of basic science, the conclusions of
framework science, and the existence of a diagnostic methodology that can
identify particular instances of a relevant phenomenon are all general
scientific propositions that extend beyond any individual case. Only the
issue of whether a particular methodology was properly applied to a
particular case can be truly case-specific, and even here certain issues can
transcend the case and thus fall in the judge’s bailiwick.
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1. Category 1: Basic Science.—Scientists ordinarily begin with a
hypothesis or theory about the existence of some phenomenon, which
typically occurs at a fairly abstract and indistinct level. This type of
research is usually not conducted with the courtroom in mind and has many
uses beyond legal ones. The corpus of research on memory and perception,
for example, is highly varied and, at least in its earliest forms, had no clear
relevance to any courtroom application.156 Likewise, the early landmark
research on DNA had no pretensions to forensic use.157
Nonetheless, this research might easily form the basis for expert
testimony. Consider, for example, one of the foundational bases for modern
eyewitness research, the finding that the brain does not operate like a video
camera.158 If expert testimony were offered on the ways that leading or
misleading questions can contaminate an eyewitness’s account of some
event, the expert is likely to discuss basic brain function and the ways that
brains encode and retrieve memories, all based on foundational research.
Similarly, DNA profiling can be traced to the discovery of the DNA helix.
An expert explaining DNA profiling is likely to begin with the foundational
premise of the existence of the DNA molecule.159
The important point for present purposes is that this Category 1
research is of a general nature. In both of these instances, as well as
innumerable others, the basic science on which the scientific opinion
rests—whether made explicit or left implicit—is a preliminary fact that
transcends the particular case. Thus, it ought to be an admissibility
consideration.
Furthermore, that conclusion stands whether the expert is describing
the results of the research, the principles undergirding them, or the methods
used to discover them. Daubert’s distinction between methods and
conclusions is irrelevant here. What is relevant is whether the factual or
research premises on which the expert testimony rests transcend the
particular case.

156 See generally Gordon H. Bower, A Brief History of Memory Research, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF MEMORY 3 (Endel Tulving & Fergus I.M. Craik eds., 2000) (describing research on
memory in the nineteenth century).
157 See Sarah L. Bunce, Comment, United States v. Kincade—Justifying the Seizure of One’s
Identity, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 747, 749–53 (2005) (noting that, while DNA was first discovered in
1869, it was not used in litigation until the late twentieth century).
158 See, e.g., Donna J. Bridge & Joel L. Voss, Hippocampal Binding of Novel Information with
Dominant Memory Traces Can Support Both Memory Stability and Change, 34 J. NEUROSCIENCE 2203
(2014); Elizabeth F. Loftus & Jacqueline E. Pickrell, The Formation of False Memories,
25 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 720 (1995).
159 See generally JAMES D. WATSON, THE ANNOTATED AND ILLUSTRATED DOUBLE HELIX
(Alexander Gann & Jan Witkowski eds., 2012) (describing the discovery of the structure of DNA).
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2. Category 2: Framework Science.—The majority of scientific
research involves the exploration of hypotheses that are suggested by, or
thought to be consistent with, Category 1 theories. This work occupies
Category 2. It is vast, diverse, and frequently proffered as a basis for expert
evidence in court. For example, as noted above, Category 1 theories of
brain function theorize that memory does not operate like a video camera
that stores accurate representations of our experiences in an unalterable
database, but rather deteriorates rapidly over time and is easily influenced
by subsequent events. This theory has been tested and its parameters
specified in a host of areas potentially highly relevant to legal disputes,
including eyewitness accuracy, children as witnesses, lie detection, false
confessions, and repressed memories.160 We call this latter type of
testimony “framework” testimony because it provides a frame for legally
relevant behavior.
Framework research is inherently general and its validity does not
depend on the circumstances of a particular case.161 The issues this category
addresses, such as whether Bendectin causes birth defects, sleep
deprivation contributes to false confessions, trichloroethylene causes
cancer, or young children are highly suggestible, transcend individual
disputes. The soundness of this research does not depend on locale; it is as
“true,” or as “false,” in San Francisco as it is in Nashville or
Charlottesville. And, as with basic science, both the methods and the
conclusions of this type of research fit this description.
It should also be noted that the validity of Category 2 research does
not depend on the existence of a Category 1 foundational phenomenon. To
be sure, a compelling umbrella phenomenon can help situate specific
research findings. But the annals of science are replete with Category 2
framework-type research that does not fit any existing paradigm. For
example, research on predictions of violence has few theoretical
pretensions but, at least when based on sound research methods, will be
sufficiently valid to admit.162 Similarly, research might show, to a high
degree of confidence, that benzene causes a particular form of leukemia,

160 See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 19, ch. 15 (eyewitness identifications); id. ch. 16 (children’s
memory and testimony); id. ch. 19 (repressed memories); 5 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 19, ch. 38
(polygraph tests); Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2009).
161 Of course, its relevance (or fit) might very well depend on the particulars of the case. Research
on cross-race identifications might be valid, but it would obviously be irrelevant, and thus inadmissible,
in a case that involved a same-race identification.
162 See John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners,
Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 405–27 (2006); Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of
Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 50–53 (2003).
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but scientists might not be able to identify the specific biological
mechanism of this relationship.163 From the law’s perspective, therefore,
well-validated Category 2 framework evidence might be admissible even
absent a more general theory.
3. Category 3: Diagnostic Science.—In some cases the only type of
expert testimony presented will consist of Category 1 and Category 2
research, or Category 2 research alone. For instance, expert eyewitness
testimony usually reports only general research findings and does not
address whether a particular eyewitness is likely to be accurately reporting
what was observed.164 If it did, however, reliability concerns arise not only
in connection with its general research basis but also with respect to the
method used to apply that research to the case at hand. The latter issue
implicates Category 3 inference, which we call diagnostic science, because
it is concerned with whether there are methods available, grounded in
sound science, that permit determining whether particular cases are
instances of some general phenomenon.
As with Categories 1 and 2, the applied methods of Category 3 expert
testimony will describe the results of preexisting research or scientific
practice and be applicable across cases. For instance, doctors purport to be
able to diagnose an individual using specific types of tests or protocols
developed and used in past cases.165 Similarly, psychiatrists purporting to
address the mental state of a criminal defendant rely, or should rely, on
specific interview techniques that are generally accepted in the
profession.166 DNA experts often assert they can match the defendant’s
DNA with DNA found at a crime scene with a high degree of certainty
based on well-developed methods, such as polymerase chain reaction

163 Jac A. Nickoloff et al., Mechanisms of Leukemia Translocations, 15 CURRENT OPINION
HEMATOLOGY 338, 340 (2008).
164 See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 19, § 15:1 (describing typical testimony by eyewitness
experts).
165 See STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 531 (28th ed. 2006) (defining “differential diagnosis”
as “the determination of which of two or more diseases with similar symptoms is the one from which
the patient is suffering, by a systematic comparison and contrasting of the clinical findings”); THOMAS
B. NEWMAN & MICHAEL A. KOHN, EVIDENCE-BASED DIAGNOSIS 3 (2009) (describing differential
diagnosis).
166 Two examples are the Rogers Criminal Responsibility Assessment Scales (R-CRAS), which
purports to assist in evaluations of mental state at the time of an offense, and the MacArthur
Competence Assessment Tool for Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA), which purports to assist in
evaluating defendants’ competency to proceed. See Norman G. Poythress, MacArthur Competence
Assessment Tool for Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA), in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY AND
LAW 464 (Brian L. Cutler ed., 2008); Richard Rogers, Rogers Criminal Responsibility Assessment
Scales (R-CRAS), in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW, supra, at 703.
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(PCR) technology.167 Thus, as with the previous two categories,
determining whether Category 3 testimony is valid should also be decided
as a matter of admissibility.168
While Category 2 science might proceed without a corresponding
Category 1 overarching theory, Category 3 research cannot exist without
the findings of Category 2 framework science. If research fails to
demonstrate to a sufficient degree of confidence that a particular Category
2 finding is valid, there can be no method available to identify instances of
that finding. Put another way, if the major premise (i.e., Category 2) of a
scientific assertion has not been shown to exist, the minor premise (i.e.,
Category 3) cannot be sound. For example, if research does not support the
Category 2 statement that Bendectin can cause birth defects, no methods
can exist to demonstrate that particular cases of birth defects are
attributable to Bendectin.
At the same time, many areas of science might be well supported at
the Category 2 framework level but have little or no basis in Category 3. In
other words, framework research might indicate that a particular finding is
true in general, but scientists may not have been able to develop a
diagnostic methodology that permits valid statements to be made about
individual cases. This appears to be the case, for instance, with respect to
the accuracy of individual eyewitnesses;169 if so, eyewitness experts should
not be allowed to offer Category 3 testimony.
Indeed, the key insight of G2i is that typically the ultimate casespecific question in the courtroom is not the subject of study in science.
Because science is usually limited to exploring group differences and
general phenomena, no scientific methodology reasoning from group data
to individual cases may exist; to put the point another way, the law often
asks empirical questions to which scientists have no answers. Thus, as
Joiner signaled,170 courts evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony

167

See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 602 F. Supp. 2d 658, 664–67, 677 (D. Md. 2009) (describing
PCR technology and how “statistics are used to evaluate how likely it is that a similar match would
occur if the DNA sample were drawn randomly from the population” in holding that “there is no basis
under Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence to exclude evidence of the DNA matches in this case”).
168 Cf. Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Law and the Art of Modeling: Are Models Facts?, 103 GEO. L.J.
825, 852 (2015) (“Models and their conclusions . . . are better evaluated by a judge . . . .” (footnote
omitted)). In Faigman, Monahan & Slobogin, supra note 18, we developed an analytical framework for
making the admissibility determination with respect to such “diagnostic” testimony. See id. at 476–80
(summarizing “best practice guidelines”).
169 See Brian L. Cutler & Gary L. Wells, Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Identification, in
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM: CONSENSUS AND CONTROVERSY 100, 113 (Jennifer L.
Skeem, Kevin S. Douglas & Scott O. Lilienfeld eds., 2009) (“The state of the science . . . does not
permit an assessment of the accuracy of an individual eyewitness.”).
170 See supra text accompanying notes 55–58.
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purporting to address the case before them need to be very careful in
deciding whether the case is an instance of some relevant phenomenon that
science has studied.
An example of such caution comes from a series of Supreme Court
cases analyzing the relevance of developmental studies and neuroscience to
sentencing decisions in juvenile cases. In Roper v. Simmons,171 the Court
held that the developmental immaturity of adolescents is relevant under the
principles of the Eighth Amendment, and that this immaturity is a key
reason adolescents as a group should be exempted from the death
penalty.172 In subsequent cases, the Court relied on the same reasoning in
concluding that adolescents may not be sentenced to life without parole
(LWOP) for nonhomicide offenses and may not receive a mandatory
sentence of LWOP for homicide offenses.173 The holdings of these cases all
depend on a Category 2 determination that, on average, adolescents are
sufficiently less developmentally mature that they should be treated
differently than adults.
Yet, as a practical matter, this Category 2 framework judgment must
be followed by individual sentencing decisions. One can imagine Category
2 science that helps in these situations as well. For instance, research on
juvenile development might be able to make broad pronouncements about
the relative maturity of 15- to 17-year-olds as opposed to 12- to 14-yearolds and 18- to 20-year-olds.174 But judges and litigants usually also want
the expert to address the maturity of a specific adolescent, not just an agerelated category of adolescents. If so, a Category 3 diagnostic question
arises. Specifically, is there a valid scientific methodology or test that
would permit courts to assess the developmental maturity of individual
adolescents?

171

543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Id. at 569–71 (stating, after surveying the developmental literature, that “[o]nce the diminished
culpability of juveniles is recognized, it is evident that the penological justifications for the death
penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults”).
173 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 91–92 (2010) (holding that sentencing a juvenile to life without
parole for a nonhomicide offense violates the Eighth Amendment, in part because “culpability or
blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity” (quoting
Roper, 543 U.S. at 571)); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (holding that mandatory
sentencing of a juvenile to life without parole for a homicide violates the Eighth Amendment, and
explaining that “Roper and Graham emphasized that the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the
penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they
commit terrible crimes”).
174 See, e.g., Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence:
Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 752, 756 (2000)
(presenting data differentiating eighth graders, tenth graders, twelfth graders, and young adults in terms
of their capacity to make prosocial judgments).
172
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In Roper, the Court in essence concluded that the absence of such a
diagnostic methodology required adopting a categorical rule exempting
everyone under eighteen years of age from the death penalty.175 Justice
Kennedy conceded that some juvenile offenders possess adult-level
maturity.176 But he added that psychologists cannot reliably identify the
members of this subset, stating, “It is difficult even for expert psychologists
to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose
crime reflects irreparable corruption.”177
Of course, the fact that scientists have yet to develop a valid method to
determine whether an individual case is an instance of some general
phenomenon does not have to mean that the courts must rely solely on
Category 1 and 2 evidence and cannot address the individual case at all.
Rather, the lack of a Category 3 applied methodology will usually simply
require that the courtroom factfinder decide the issue without expert
assistance. For example, in noncapital sentencing decisions involving
juveniles, adolescent maturity is still very relevant,178 and judges lacking
Category 3 expert testimony can base their assessment of a particular
juvenile’s culpability on lay and observational evidence.
In sum, judges need to determine the reliability not only of Category 1
and Category 2 testimony, but of Category 3 diagnostic testimony as well.
In doing so, they should keep in mind that many areas of scientific
evidence have no methodologies available to assist juries in deciding
whether the case before them is an instance of the general phenomenon of
interest. In such cases, only Category 1 and 2 expert testimony should be
permitted as a means of educating the jury, which is then left to determine
the applicability of the general scientific findings to the instant case.
4. Category 4: Application of Diagnostic Science.—While science
generally is devoted to the G and not the i, there are some areas of
scientific evidence—medical and psychiatric testimony were mentioned
above—in which experts claim to have developed principles and methods
that enable them to assist the jury in saying something about a single case.
The previous sections considered whether those principles and methods are
valid as a general matter. If they are, then the sole remaining admissibility–
weight issue is whether the expert, in the words of Rule 702(d), “has

175

See 543 U.S. at 573–75.
Id. at 574.
177 Id. at 573.
178 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (indicating that “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate
risks and consequences” should be taken into account in sentencing juveniles).
176
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reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”179 This
is Category 4.
This category, in contrast to the previous three, is relevant only to the
case at hand. It should thus generally fall in the jury’s domain, not the
judge’s. However, it is important to distinguish two ways in which
application of a diagnostic method could be compromised. The first is
when the expert concededly fails to employ an approved diagnostic
methodology but instead uses some variation on (or an alternative to) the
approved methodology. The second is when the parties dispute whether the
approved methodology was followed. In the first instance, the expert is, in
essence, claiming that a variation on the approved methodology is
sufficiently reliable, which makes the issue a Category 3 diagnostic
question that should be heard by the judge. In the second instance, in
contrast, the issue is a case-specific dispute over the expert’s conduct, and
is a matter for the jury.
For example, assume that the PCR technology for DNA analysis
discussed earlier has been found valid as a diagnostic method either in the
instant case or in previous cases. In our view, the judge should also
determine, as a preliminary matter, that the expert claims to have used the
PCR test. If instead the expert admits that he or she did not use the PCR
test but rather some other test, the expert should not be allowed to testify
unless the judge finds that the test employed is also reliable. If, on the other
hand, the expert claims he or she used the PCR test and did so in the
manner it is intended to be used, the jury ought to be allowed to determine
whether the expert is telling the truth about these claims.
This second issue, in contrast to the first one, is entirely case-specific.
Whether the expert used the PCR test properly in the instant case is a fact
that will apply to no other case. We therefore would draw a distinction
within Category 4 between whether the expert used a validated
methodology in the case at hand (an issue of admissibility under Rules
702(d) and 104(a)), and whether the expert who claims he or she used the
valid methodology the way it is supposed to be used in fact did so (an issue
of weight).
We would also impose one significant restriction on the jury’s usual
prerogative to make final determinations on the Category 4 issue of
whether the expert properly used a validated diagnostic methodology: a
conditional relevance limitation. Even under that relatively jury-centric
approach to scientific evidence, the judge is required to withhold from the
jury preliminary facts proof of which is so weak that no rational jury could
179

FED. R. EVID. 702(d).
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conclude they existed. This scenario can occur fairly often with respect to
expert testimony. The cases are rife with situations in which the expert
clearly did not follow the generally accepted procedure.180 If a reasonable
trier of fact could not find that the expert properly used the validated
methodology,181 then the judge should not allow the jury to hear the
testimony based on it.182
One might well ask why that same concern should not leave for the
judge the assessment of any preliminary fact that is associated with
scientific evidence, even one that is not obviously erroneous, given that
such evidence is usually complicated in nature.183 However, our position on
Category 4 application testimony better reflects the constitutional and
evidentiary preference for jury decisionmaking on issues of credibility.184
180

This includes Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, where the expert did not follow his own stated
methodology. 526 U.S. 137, 155–56 (1999) (noting that expert testified that “where there is reason to
suspect an abnormal bead groove he would ideally ‘look at a lot of [similar] tires’ to know the
grooving’s significance, and that he had not looked at many tires similar to the one at issue” (alteration
in original)); see also Mut. Benefit Ins. Co. v. Kaz, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-2108, 2014 WL 671445, at *3
(M.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2014) (differentiating the instant case from one involving a fire investigation where
“the expert admitted that he did not follow any fixed set of guidelines”); U.S. Filter Corp. v. Ionics,
Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 48, 68 (D. Mass. 1999) (finding no credible evidence in support of the expert’s
contention because the “defendant’s witness admitted that the sieving procedure used by [the expert]
was flawed”); Brown v. Lifescan, Inc., No. 96 C 6215, 1998 WL 42264, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 1998)
(noting that the expert “admitted that his sample was too small to provide an opinion . . . and that he did
not follow accepted protocol for testing blood glucose monitors”).
181 Determining whether a methodological step is critical can be a difficult question. Cf. In re Paoli
R.R. Yard PCB Litig. 35 F.3d 717, 745 n.14 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[I]f a court finds that an expert has
employed a methodology only slightly different from a methodology that the court thinks is clearly
reliable, the court should be more likely to accept the altered methodology than if it was evaluating that
methodology as an original matter.”).
182 See, e.g., Carlson v. Okerstrom, 675 N.W.2d 89, 105 (Neb. 2004) (“When a step in an otherwise
valid methodology is performed incorrectly, we fail to see how the expert’s results can be any more
reliable than if the methodology itself had been wholly invalid. Accordingly, we hold that it is not
enough for the trial court to determine that an expert’s methodology is valid in the abstract. The trial
court must also determine if the witness has applied the methodology in a reliable manner.”). One
method of performing this judicial filtering role is to require the expert to provide an affidavit that the
methodology was carried out properly. Another is to require that the affidavit include “facts that both
agree and disagree with [the expert’s] opinion—information that will ‘help others to judge the value of
[the expert’s] contribution.’” Shelley Storer, The Weight Versus Admissibility Dilemma: Daubert’s
Applicability to a Method or Procedure in a Particular Case, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 231, 251 (second
alteration in original) (quoting RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, “SURELY YOU’RE JOKING, MR. FEYNMAN!” 312
(1985)).
183 See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 125, at 34 (arguing that when there is a “genuine credibility
dispute” the judge ought to hear opposing evidence that has “relatively direct relevance to the
credibility dispute”).
184 See supra text accompanying notes 142–43. It is also the view of numerous courts. See, e.g.,
United States v. Gipson, 383 F.3d 689, 697 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen the application of a scientific
methodology is challenged as unreliable under Daubert and the methodology itself is otherwise
sufficiently reliable, outright exclusion of the evidence in question is warranted only if the methodology
‘was so altered [by a deficient application] as to skew the methodology itself.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1448 (8th Cir. 1996))); State v. Langill, 945 A.2d 1,
11 (N.H. 2008) (“Where errors do not rise to the level of ‘negat[ing] the basis for the reliability of the
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When the probative value of proffered expert testimony depends on the
validity of the methods or statistical analyses employed in the underlying
research (Category 3), clues drawn from demeanor or general context are
unlikely to provide much insight into a witness’s veracity. However, when
the factual dispute is case specific—Did the forensic lab staff mix DNA
samples?185 Did the psychologist follow the MMPI protocol? Does the
plaintiff have brain damage? Is the defendant suffering from
schizophrenia?—demeanor, context, and other intuitive markers are likely
to be available to permit the jury to weigh the evidence.
To be sure, research indicates that demeanor is not a very good basis
for assessing credibility and that laypersons have difficulty distinguishing
truthful statements from deceitful ones.186 Although these facts might
reduce confidence in jury fact-finding, there is no reason to believe that
judges are any better.187 That people may be bad lie detectors is an inherent
limitation of our system of trial process. Given the importance of the jury
system to that process, the default must be that jurors have the latitude to
make the sort of assessments that are presented by case-specific disputes.
Jurors have as much, and possibly more, common sense capacity as judges
to resolve disputes over whether the technician or other expert in the case
did what she said she did.188 Hence, although judges must ensure that a
validated methodology exists and that it was ostensibly employed in the
case at hand, the jury should decide whether it was applied reliably, unless
the judge finds such clear evidence to the contrary that no rational juror
could consider the testimony based on it credible.

principle itself,’ the adversary process is available to highlight the errors and permit the fact-finder to
assess the weight and credibility of the expert’s conclusions.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1198 (8th Cir. 1993))); Wise v. Ludlow, 346 P.3d 1,
15 (Wyo. 2015) (“Differential diagnosis is a reliable methodology. If [the expert] did not correctly
follow the methodology of differential diagnosis, that could affect the weight and persuasiveness of her
opinions, but does not render that evidence inadmissible under Daubert.”).
185 For instance, in studying DNA, four classes of performance errors have been identified: “quirks
of nature,” honest mistakes, negligence, and fraud, all of which could affect validity. Bert Black et al.,
Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV.
715, 775 (1994). In our view, disputes of this nature should be determined by the jury, based on
evidence presented by the parties, unless no rational jury could find an absence of error.
186 See generally Aldert Vrij, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT: PITFALLS AND OPPORTUNITIES (2008);
Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2557 (2008).
187 See generally Stephen Porter & Leanne ten Brinke, Dangerous Decisions: A Theoretical
Framework for Understanding How Judges Assess Credibility in the Courtroom, 14 LEGAL &
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 119 (2009); Sheng Kung Michael Yi et al., The Wisdom of the Crowd in
Combinatorial Problems, 36 COGNITIVE SCI. 452 (2012).
188 See generally Charles F. Bond Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Individual Differences in Judging
Deception: Accuracy and Bias, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 477 (2008); Barbara A. Spellman & Elizabeth R.
Tenney, Credible Testimony in and out of Court, 17 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 168 (2010).
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C. A Test Based On Scientific Inference
Rule 702 requires that testimony be “the product of reliable principles
and methods” and also requires that the witness “reliably appl[y] the
principles and methods to the facts of the case.”189 Translating our
categories into the Rules’ “principles and methods” language, the results
derived from the inferences described in Categories 1 and 2 are best
classified under the principles rubric. Both basic research and framework
research produce findings setting out general scientific principles. Category
3, in contrast, has more to do with methods, in particular whether the
diagnostic methods used by the expert are a reliable means of addressing
the specific facts of the case at hand. Finally, Category 4 has to do with
both principles and methods, specifically, whether the expert followed a
scientifically tested procedure and reached a scientifically helpful
conclusion about an issue related solely to the case at hand.
With our categories of science thus translated, we reproduce our
proposal for determining when a fact associated with scientific evidence
should be decided by the judge as a matter of admissibility or by the jury as
a matter of weight:
Preliminary facts that describe the principles or methods of scientific research
or generally applicable conclusions drawn therefrom are within the judge’s
responsibility to decide as a matter of admissibility under Federal Rule of
Evidence 104(a) and equivalent state rules. Conditional facts that describe
whether the expert adhered to a reliable principle or method are matters of
weight and within the province of the trier of fact to decide if a reasonable
trier of fact could find that the fact is true, as provided in Federal Rule of
Evidence 104(b).

Again, our argument, based on Joiner, is that generalizable scientific
conclusions, as well as scientific principles and methods, must be evaluated
by the judge. Thus, under this proposal, testimony about scientific research
would be admissible only if the judge finds (by a preponderance of the
evidence)190 that both the methods and principles underlying the research
and all generally applicable conclusions derived from that research are
reliable. If that threshold is crossed (and other evidentiary prerequisites are
met),191 juries would hear the expert’s testimony unless no rational juror
could give it credence. Of course, jurors are free to reassess the validity of
189

FED. R. EVID. 702(d).
See supra note 4.
191 Our proposed rule says nothing about other criteria of admissibility, including fit, helpfulness,
and an assessment of whether the prejudicial impact of the evidence outweighs its probative value. The
judge must evaluate these issues as well. For proposals as to how the judge should carry out that task,
based on the same general–specific distinction made in the text, see Faigman, Monahan & Slobogin,
supra note 18, at 472–80.
190
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admitted evidence and must ultimately decide how much weight admitted
scientific evidence merits. Case-specific conditional facts that underlie
expert testimony are necessarily part of that weight determination and are
principally within the province of the jury to decide.192
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS
The G2i concept has implications not only for the trial court’s
assessment of scientific evidence in Categories 1 through 4 but also the
appellate court’s assessment of the trial court’s decisions on those matters.
Because the first three categories are general in nature, applicable across all
cases involving similar scientific issues, the appellate court ought to
analyze the trial court’s decisions about them in the same way it considers a
trial court’s decisions about generally applicable legal principles. Earlier
we noted how the Supreme Court has signaled that constitutional facts
ought to be the province of appellate courts and treated like precedent.193 So
too here, appellate courts should see their role in scientific evidence cases
as monitors of the lower courts’ analysis of general scientific principles and
guardians of scientific consistency across cases within their jurisdiction.194

192

It is possible that the judge might find that, even if the expert properly carried out the procedure,
the resulting diagnostic opinion is incredible because it makes too great a leap from the information
known to the expert. This determination bears significant similarity to the judgment the court must
make under Rule 704(b), which provides that an expert’s opinion that reaches the ultimate issue of
“whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the
crime charged or of a defense” is “for the trier of fact alone,” on the ground that testimony that a person
is sane or insane is not based on specialized knowledge. FED. R. EVID. 704(b). Although Rule 704
otherwise permits ultimate issue testimony, the Advisory Committee Note states that, even in cases that
do not involve psychiatric testimony, the trial court must determine that the subject matter of the
testimony presented is “helpful to the trier of fact” and could also be excluded under Rule 403’s
balancing of probative value against dangers such as undue prejudice. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory
committee’s note.
193 See supra text accompanying notes 138–43.
194 Others have reached the same conclusion, albeit without referencing how it aligns with the
nature of scientific research. See, e.g., In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184, 1189 (Ill. 2004)
(“The trial court’s Frye analysis . . . is now subject to de novo review. In conducting such de novo
review, the reviewing court may consider not only the trial court record but also, where appropriate,
sources outside the record, including legal and scientific articles, as well as court opinions from other
jurisdictions.”); State v. O’Key, 899 P.2d 663, 688 n.45 (Or. 1995) (en banc) (“When the preliminary
facts are not case-specific, little or no deference to the trial court’s finding is appropriate.”); Lisa
Heinzerling, Doubting Daubert, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 65, 81 (2006) (“One of the potential embarrassments
of Joiner’s abuse of discretion standard is the possibility of apparently inconsistent evidentiary
judgments among courts. Since one consequence of this lenient standard of review is that district judges
may come to different conclusions on the same evidence, it may be that different judges could find [that
evidence regarding a theory of causation] is both reliable and unreliable.”); Christopher B. Mueller,
Daubert Asks the Right Questions: Now Appellate Courts Should Help Find the Right Answers,
33 SETON HALL L. REV. 987, 988–89 (2003) (“[T]he Daubert revolution would achieve more if
appellate courts abandoned the abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing the rulings of trial judges in
this area.”).
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This insight, if accepted, would mean that the decision in Joiner
would have to be revisited. Although we earlier signaled our agreement
with Joiner’s requirement that the reliability of both the expert’s methods
and the expert’s conclusions be examined by trial judges, we do not agree
with the part of the opinion holding that appellate courts should review trial
court opinions about expert opinion admissibility under an abuse of
discretion standard.195 In the course of so holding, Joiner specifically
rejected the lower court’s application of a “stringent” standard of review on
the admissibility decision, stating that this standard “failed to give the trial
court the deference that is the hallmark of abuse-of-discretion review.”196 In
our view, such deference should only be accorded trial court rulings about
case-specific facts, not those adopting generalized propositions. As we
developed in Part II, a generalized scientific proposition is closer to law
than it is to fact and should be treated accordingly. Thus, while decisions
about Category 4 should be subject to an abuse of discretion standard, trial
court decisions about the other three categories ought to be reviewed more
“stringently.” If our analogy between legal principles and scientific
principles and methods stands, that review should be de novo.197
Another advantage of this approach to appellate review is that it
counters, at least to some extent, the criticism that the Daubert revolution
gives too much power to trial court judges.198 This is not just the complaint
that juries should be allowed to provide a different viewpoint than judges
(which we think is germane only in Category 4 cases), but the observation
that judges are not always driven solely by the goal of assuring the
evidence rules are followed. For instance, after cataloguing the various
tangential and sometimes illegitimate agendas that might influence trial
judges making evidentiary decisions in cases involving scientific evidence,
one commentator lamented that “judges can be fairly certain that their
Daubert rulings will not be overturned” and that “[s]uch deference gives
trial judges more opportunity to insert their policy opinions into their

195

See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997).
Id. at 143.
197 This is the appellate review standard that applies to trial court findings of law. See, e.g., United
States v. Sandsness, 988 F.2d 970, 971 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Matters of law are reviewed de novo.”). As the
Supreme Court has observed, “de novo review tends to unify precedent.” Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996).
198 See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or Double
Error?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 775 (1998) (stating that the Joiner decision “places too much discretion
in the hands of district judges and makes the outcomes of toxic tort cases in federal courts turn on the
prejudices of the particular judge rather than on principles of law”); Jeffrey Robert White, Experts and
Judges, TRIAL, Sept. 1998, at 91, 92 (arguing that Joiner will likely lead to an erosion of the jury’s factfinding role).
196
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decisions.”199 A more stringent appellate review standard—the de novo
standard we advocate—would curtail that possibility.200
CONCLUSION
The manner in which scientists make inferences has important
implications for evidence law. One such implication is that, in all cases
involving scientific testimony, the division of responsibilities between
judge and jury and between trial and appellate courts should be rethought.
Because most science derives from study of groups and applies across more
than one case, it has many of the attributes of law and should be treated in
the same fashion. Thus, trial judges should assess the reliability not only of
the expert’s methods but also of any conclusions reached by the expert,
unless they relate solely to the case at hand. At the same time, whether the
expert properly applied a reliable method and whether an expert’s
conclusion that relates solely to the case at hand should be given credence
are matters of weight for a jury—unless the judge finds that no rational
juror could credit the expert’s assertions on these issues. Appellate courts
should exercise deference toward the trial court’s admissibility decision
with respect to the jury’s case-specific determinations, but should apply a
stringent review standard to whether the method the expert purported to use
was reliable and whether any generally applicable conclusions purporting
to be derived from that methodology were reliably reached.
This alignment of the admissibility–weight determination with the
nature of scientific inference also comports with constitutional and
evidentiary desideratum. It requires that scientific reliability be assessed by
the entities—trial and appellate courts—best equipped to do so, while
maintaining the role of the jury as the ultimate arbiter of those case-specific
facts that require a credibility assessment and could rationally be decided
either way. It is simpler to administer than other admissibility–weight
frameworks because the four categories of scientific inference it
199 Krista M. Pikus, Note, We the People: Juries, Not Judges, Should Be the Gatekeepers of Expert
Evidence, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 453, 472 (2014); see also Allan Kanner & M. Ryan Casey, Daubert
and the Disappearing Jury, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 297–98 (2007) (arguing that because of
“increasing caseloads, insufficient trial experience, the duty to ‘manage’ cases, and a bias toward
industry,” judges are presented with overwhelming incentives to exclude experts and dismiss cases
under Daubert).
200 While we think the trial court’s reliability decision ought to be subject to stringent review, its
decision about other admissibility issues—fit, helpfulness, and prejudicial impact—might be very casespecific and thus entitled to more deference. For instance, some trial courts hold that expert testimony
about eyewitnesses only fits when eyewitnesses are the sole “important” evidence proffered by the
prosecution. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 19, § 15:9. Some courts find testimony about rape trauma
syndrome helpful only when the alleged rape victim has acted in a “counterintuitive” manner after the
rape. Id. § 14:2. While the expert testimony in either of these two scenarios might be “reliable,” the trial
court may exclude it for other, highly case-specific reasons.
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contemplates can easily be identified by whether they rely on preexisting,
general research and practice or instead involve case-specific assessments.
Finally, the proposal provides the best court-monitored mechanism for
ensuring that courtroom use of science is both sophisticated and consistent
across cases.
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